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THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN A CARCERAL 
STATE 
Alice Ristroph 
ABSTRACT—Is an armed citizenry consistent with a carceral state? 
Throughout the twentieth century, the Second Amendment cast no shadow 
on the U.S. Supreme Court as the Court crafted the constitutional doctrines 
that license America’s expansive criminal legal system. Under the Court’s 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the fact or mere possibility that an 
individual is armed can generate broad powers for police officers, including 
the power to disarm. But since the Court embraced an individual right to bear 
arms in 2008, a few scholars and lower courts have begun to worry that this 
right contradicts contemporary understandings of police authority. In this 
Essay, I acknowledge these apparent doctrinal contradictions but argue that 
Fourth and Second Amendment doctrines actually share a common 
conceptual foundation: carceral political theory. Carceral political theory 
divides people into “criminals” and “law-abiding citizens” and does so 
according to intuitions about natural criminality rather than through positive 
law. The supposed distinction between the criminal and the law-abiding is 
used to rationalize unequal distributions of political power, social goods, and 
exposure to violence. In the United States, the naturalized conception of 
criminality has long been racialized. Unless we identify and reject the 
carceral assumptions that underlie both Fourth and Second Amendment 
doctrine, the new (or newly recognized) right to bear arms is likely to further 
exacerbate racial inequality in the United States. 
 
AUTHOR—Professor, Brooklyn Law School. Many thanks to the Duke 
Center for Firearms Law and the Northwestern University Law Review for 
the opportunity to participate in this Symposium, and to Joseph Blocher, Jake 
Charles, and Darrell Miller for comments on drafts of this Essay. I am also 
grateful for feedback from workshop participants at the University of 
Connecticut School of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 
University of Wisconsin Law School, and the Virtual Workshop on the 
Political Turn(s) in Criminal Law Theory. 
  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
204 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 204 
I. CARCERAL POLITICAL THEORY ............................................................................ 208 
II. CARCERAL PRINCIPLES IN CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE ....................................... 215 
A. Rights for the Innocent, but Not for “Criminals” ....................................... 216 
B. Arms for the Law-Abiding, to Be Used Against “Criminals” ..................... 222 
III. WHICH LIVES MATTER? TWO THEORIES OF SELF-DEFENSE .................................. 230 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 235 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early years of the new millennium, Americans (or at least some 
of them) seemed to awaken and recognize two previously overlooked legal 
truths. The first realization concerned criminal law; the second, the 
Constitution. Although imprisonment rates had been climbing for a few 
decades before 2000 and racial disparities in criminal law enforcement had 
existed for even longer, the early years of the twenty-first century saw the 
first widespread recognition of racialized “mass incarceration.”1 Legal elites 
and then the public more broadly identified a “crisis” in criminal justice.2 
Though it was not the first time such a crisis had been identified, the scale of 
the crisis and the degree of consensus about it seemed new.3 
The second moment of realization came in 2008 with the Supreme 
Court’s determination that the Second Amendment protects an individual 
right to bear arms. Of course, there is an ongoing dispute about whether 
District of Columbia v. Heller really was, as the majority opinion claimed, 
simply a belated recognition of a right that had existed since the eighteenth 
century or even earlier.4 The Heller dissenters, and many commentators, 
argued that five Justices of the Court crafted a new right in 2008 rather than 
 
 1 See JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL 3 (2014) (noting that incarceration rates 
began to rise in the 1970s, and the increases were easily discernible by the 1980s, but it took about twenty-
five more years for critiques of mass incarceration to “gain some traction politically”). For more on the 
connotations of the term mass incarceration, see infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 2 See Alice Ristroph, An Intellectual History of Mass Incarceration, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1949, 2000–06 
(2019) (examining shifting ideas of “crisis” in criminal law in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries). 
 3 See id. at 2004–06; see also Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based 
Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 550 (2016) (“The turning point in the conversation about 
mass incarceration came around the turn of the century . . . .”). 
 4 554 U.S. 570, 625–26 (2008) (claiming to adopt “the original understanding of the Second 
Amendment” and claiming that “[i]t should be unsurprising that such a significant matter has been for so 
long judicially unresolved”). 
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recognized an old one.5 Whether or not an individual right to bear arms 
existed outside of constitutional doctrine before Heller, it is clear that Heller 
is the Court’s first direct affirmation of such a right. 
These two realizations have prompted new questions about whether 
both truths can endure. Are the expansive powers of American police forces, 
which are one of several factors enabling racialized mass incarceration, 
compatible with an individual right to bear arms? In Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, the prospect that a person may be armed often expands police 
authority to conduct searches and seizures and to use force.6 Can such 
authority be sustained after Heller, or do we face, as one commentator has 
put it, a possible collision “at the intersection of Second and Fourth”?7 Are 
doctrinal adjustments—to police authority, gun rights, or both—necessary to 
avoid the collision, as several commentators have suggested?8 
This Essay acknowledges these apparent doctrinal conflicts but 
suggests that they may be an illusion. There is, in fact, an underlying 
conceptual consistency across the laws that enable mass incarceration and 
the post-Heller constitutional law of gun rights. Both areas of law license 
violence as a response to “criminals,” with a specific conception of 
criminality that has less to do with one’s acts and more to do with one’s 
status. In the way of thinking that I will describe as “carceral political 
theory,” criminality serves as a principle of political organization, dividing 
the populace into “law-abiding citizens” and “criminals.” Political goods and 
power are distributed according to that organizing principle; so too is the 
license to do violence and protection from it. Inequality of rights and power 
is critical to the model, and thus “a carceral state” is distinct from a police 
 
 5 Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Specifically, there is no indication that the Framers of the 
Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution.”); see, e.g., 
Dennis Baron, Corpus Evidence Illuminates the Meaning of Bear Arms, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509, 
510 (2019) (arguing that “Justice Scalia was wrong” to conclude in Heller that the Founders intended the 
Second Amendment to encompass an individual right to bear arms unconnected to militia service); Reva 
B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 
192 (2008) (“Heller’s originalism enforces understandings of the Second Amendment that were forged 
in the late twentieth century . . . .”). 
 6 See infra Section II.A. 
 7 J. Richard Broughton, Danger at the Intersection of Second and Fourth, 54 IDAHO L. REV. 379, 
379, 381–82 (2018). 
 8 See Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 6, 34–42 (2015) (“[T]he 
transforming gun-rights landscape undermines the Fourth Amendment validity of . . . gun-oriented 
policing.”); Broughton, supra note 7, at 404–06 (discussing possible changes to Fourth Amendment law 
in light of Heller); Shawn E. Fields, Stop and Frisk in a Concealed Carry World, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1675, 
1679–81 (2018) (suggesting changes to Fourth Amendment doctrine in light of Heller). But see Nirej 
Sekhon, The Second Amendment in the Street, 112 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 271, 273 (2018) (suggesting 
that the apparent “doctrinal collision” is unlikely to make a significant difference to police power “on the 
streets” given existing Fourth Amendment doctrine). 
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state or a totalitarian state, each of which is usually understood to leave all 
citizens equally subjugated or at least roughly equally vulnerable to 
subjugation.9 In a carceral state, those classified as law-abiding citizens are 
in fact less vulnerable to domination through criminal law. Indeed, those 
classified as law-abiding citizens enjoy some rights of resistance or even 
rights of domination: the right to deploy violence as a private citizen against 
the purported criminal. Conflicts between, and different rules for, the law-
abiding citizen and the criminal are part of the governance model of a 
carceral state. 
On this theoretical conception, the word “criminal” is not merely an 
adjective that modifies laws or behavior but a noun that names a certain type 
of person. As an attribute of persons rather than acts, criminality becomes 
understood in terms of character, personality, genetics—and often, race. 
Similarly, the term “law-abiding citizen” is used as an assessment of 
character and personality rather than a straight description of one’s conduct. 
Eschewing conduct identified in criminal statutes is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to be a “law-abiding citizen,” and engaging in such conduct is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to be a “criminal.” More important than 
positive law, legal process, or factual proof are vague intuitions about what 
or who is criminal by nature. 
To be sure, the U.S. Constitution contains promises of equal protection, 
and limitations of penal power, that seem at odds with carceral political 
theory. But the Constitution as interpreted (and in some instances, even as 
written) excludes criminals from its broad promises of equality.10 In criminal 
procedure decisions throughout the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
often assumed that the Constitution provides different levels of protection to 
criminals and law-abiding citizens.11 And when the Court took up the Second 
Amendment in Heller, it made clear that the right to bear arms belonged to 
law-abiding citizens but not to criminals—and indeed, the right was 
necessary so that law-abiding citizens could defend themselves against 
criminals.12 Amid all the attention given to the question of whether the 
Second Amendment protects an individual or collective right, there has been 
too little scrutiny of the Court’s choice to embrace a selective right. This 
Essay seeks to illuminate the extent to which existing doctrine protects a 
 
 9 See, e.g., Thomas Crocker, Dystopian Constitutionalism, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 633–34 
(2015) (citing the Oxford English Dictionary in support of an account of a “police state” as a dystopian 
state in which broad and discretionary police powers are used to control the population at large). 
 10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery, except “as a punishment for crime”); id. amend. 
XIV, § 2 (providing that a state’s denial of the right to vote would reduce the state’s representation in 
Congress, unless voting rights were denied “for participation in rebellion, or other crime”). 
 11 See infra Section II.A. 
12 See infra Section II.B. 
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selective right to do violence, and it invites reflection about the possibility of 
more egalitarian interpretations. 
Part I introduces the political principles and ideas that I call carceral 
political theory. It asks what it means to describe America as “a carceral 
state,” with particular emphasis on the process by which a conception of 
natural criminality supplanted slavery as the primary rationalization of 
political inequality. Part II turns to Supreme Court decisions, showing that 
principles of carceral political theory underlie constitutional criminal 
procedure as well as Heller and its progeny. With regard to Second 
Amendment doctrine, it is particularly illuminating to contrast the Court’s 
theory of a selective right of self-defense to a universal and truly egalitarian 
right of self-preservation. To that end, Part III looks closely at two influential 
theories of an individual right to use force in self-defense, both from roughly 
the same period of English history in which the Court finds the intellectual 
roots of the American right to bear arms. Thomas Hobbes articulated a 
universal and inalienable right of self-preservation, a right so robust that even 
once a state was established, individuals would possess a right to resist 
punishment. John Locke amended Hobbes’s theories to reduce or eliminate 
their radical egalitarianism, in part by naturalizing both criminality and 
punishment to rationalize a selective right to use violence. In Locke’s state 
of nature, equality turns out to be an equal right of all “innocent” persons to 
punish all “offenders.” Indeed, for Locke, self-defense comes as an 
afterthought, arising only once the state of nature has devolved into a state 
of war. It is of little surprise that Locke’s carceral political theory inspires 
many contemporary efforts to theorize the Second Amendment. And it will 
not be surprising if the right to bear arms, conceived as a selective right of 
the law-abiding to do violence against criminals, proves easily reconcilable 
with the expansive police authority of a carceral state. 
The political theory of a carceral state has been operative in the United 
States for decades, but it has not yet been recognized and scrutinized. 
Theories of the Second Amendment that would make it a right to be shared 
by all—a right to possess guns for hunting and recreation, for example, or to 
enable universal vigilance against tyranny—are increasingly obscured by a 
carceral theory that empowers some citizens to hold guns for the purpose of 
doing violence to others. As the country is confronted once again with its 
failures to achieve its promise of equality, attention is overdue for the 
carceral principles that have been incorporated into constitutional doctrine to 
legitimize inequality. 
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I. CARCERAL POLITICAL THEORY 
“Carceral political theory” is not a widely used term, but the phrase 
“carceral state” has proliferated in the last decade.13 By looking closely at the 
usage of the latter term, we may begin to identify the principles and practices 
that carceral political theory tries to explain or rationalize. Some effort at 
specificity is worthwhile, as demonstrated by debates about “mass 
incarceration” that sometimes feature different scholars using the same term 
to mean different things: is mass incarceration a description of prison 
populations specifically, or a reference to a much wider array of criminal and 
even ostensibly civil interventions?14 My own interest is in the broad 
expansion of America’s criminal legal system across many types of custodial 
and noncustodial legal interventions. Ideas influence practices, and thus this 
Part examines the ideas that seem to underlie America’s distinctively severe 
and interventionist penal practices. 
Again, “carceral state” is a useful point of departure. It may help to 
begin by noticing articles, definite or indefinite. Many commentators attach 
a definite article to the phrase: “the carceral state.” With the definite article, 
“the carceral state” is often used to refer only to the sprawling entirety of 
public institutions and practices related to criminal law, including prisons but 
extending far beyond them.15 The carceral state encompasses all of what has 
 
 13 See, e.g., Marie Gottschalk, Bring It On: The Future of Penal Reform, the Carceral State, and 
American Politics, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559, 559 (2015) (noting that “a tenacious carceral state has 
sprouted in the shadows of mass imprisonment” despite widespread “criticism of the country’s 
extraordinary incarceration rate”); Naomi Murakawa, Mass Incarceration Is Dead, Long Live the 
Carceral State!, 55 TULSA L. REV. 251, 251–52 (2020) (book review) (discussing differences between 
mass incarceration and the carceral state). 
 14 Compare, e.g., John F. Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story: Why the Conventional Wisdom 
on Prison Growth Is Wrong, and Where We Can Go from Here, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 265, 265 (2014) 
(focusing mostly on prison and sentencing statistics to argue that Michelle Alexander is “categorically 
wrong” to identify drug crimes as “the primary source of prison growth”), with MICHELLE ALEXANDER, 
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2010) (explaining that 
she uses “mass incarceration” to refer not simply to prison populations but all of “the criminal justice 
system [and] also to the larger web of laws, rules, policies, and customs that control those labeled 
criminals both in and out of prison”). For still another perspective on the term “mass incarceration,” see 
Dylan Rodríguez, Abolition as Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1583–84 
(2019), which suggests that the term mass incarceration obscures the racialized, gendered, and colonialist 
aspects of U.S. criminal law.  
 15 See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Megan Ming Francis, The Origins of Mass Incarceration: The 
Racial Politics of Crime and Punishment in the Post-Civil Rights Era, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 433, 
434–35 (2020) (distinguishing among “mass imprisonment,” referring specifically to prison populations; 
“mass incarceration,” referring to prison and jail populations together; and “the carceral state,” referring 
to a broader array of criminal interventions including policing practices); Murakawa, supra note 13, at 
251–52 (“As the infrastructure of criminalization, the carceral state includes police, criminal courts, 
probation and parole, criminal records databases and risk-assessment tools, brick-and-mortar 
incarceration, and ‘e-carceration’ with electronic shackles.”). 
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long been called “the criminal justice system.” Used in this way, the carceral 
state can exist alongside (though it may dominate) other unwieldy collections 
of government institutions and practices loosely joined by common policy 
concerns, such as “the welfare state” or “the national security state.” I take 
no strong position for or against the phrase “the carceral state,” though I 
share some commentators’ concern that the phrase (with the definite article) 
can conjure a misleading image of unity and coherence among criminal legal 
institutions—notably, a concern also raised about the phrase “the criminal 
justice system.”16 
With an indefinite article rather than a definite one, the phrase “a 
carceral state” calls to mind something slightly different. Here, the adjective 
“carceral” seems to modify the entire political structure of a given nation, 
not simply a subset of state institutions. I don’t want to overemphasize the 
distinction; some commentators use the formulation “the ___ state” to 
identify a “form of governance” if not quite a type of government.17 But I do 
think there is value in asking whether a carceral state, like a police state, a 
totalitarian state, or an authoritarian state, is a distinctive type of political 
system.18 Like the concepts of a police state or an authoritarian state, the 
concept of a carceral state is an ideal type, and there may be disagreement 
whether and how much any given existing state corresponds to the ideal type. 
I believe most invocations of “carceral state” use the phrase in the first 
sense, with the definite article. But the second usage drew considerable 
 
 16 See Ashley Rubin & Michelle S. Phelps, Fracturing the Penal State: State Actors and the Role of 
Conflict in Penal Change, 21 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 422, 428 (2017) (expressing a concern that 
references to “the carceral state” or “the penal state” can “imply singularity, coherence, and state-
centeredness rather than conflict and multiplicity”); see also Sara Mayeux, The Idea of “The Criminal 
Justice System,” 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 60 (2018) (noting that the discourse of a “criminal justice system” 
can limit the scope of critique of criminal law). 
 17 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2008) (“[T]he United States began developing a new form of governance that features the collection, 
collation, and analysis of information about populations both in the United States and around the world. 
This new form of governance is the National Surveillance State.”). Political scientists Vesla Weaver and 
Amy Lerman were early adopters of the term “the carceral state” with the specific aim of describing a 
“system of governance.” See Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the 
Carceral State, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817, 818 (2010). 
 18 David Garland has raised this question and expressed doubts that “a penal state” (or a carceral 
state) is a useful term to describe an entire type of government. He states: “In my use, the term ‘penal 
state’ is not a critical term: It is used in a neutral, nonevaluative sense to describe the agencies and 
authorities who make binding penal rules and direct their implementation. All developed nations have 
‘penal states,’ whether their penal policies are lenient or draconian. And no state ‘is’ a penal state—
penality is only ever one state sector among many and, rarely, a dominant one.” David Garland, Penality 
and the Penal State, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 475, 495 (2013). I think criminal law has far more political 
significance than Garland suggests (and separately, I am less confident than he seems to be about the 
possibility of “neutral, nonevaluative” theories of criminal legal institutions). 
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attention in Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v. Strieff,19 in which 
she denounced several lines of Fourth Amendment doctrine that together 
subject persons to expansive surveillance and policing.20 This opinion raises, 
but does not resolve, a question of equality that I see as central to the concept 
of a carceral state—namely, is “carcerality” merely a matter of the scale or 
scope of criminal interventions, or does the concept also emphasize an 
unequal distribution of those interventions? The Strieff dissent does not 
resolve that question because Justice Sotomayor both emphasized racial 
disparities in enforcement and depicted a world in which all citizens were 
subject to aggressive policing: 
The white defendant in this case shows that anyone’s dignity can be violated in 
this manner. But it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims 
of this type of scrutiny. . . . [T]his case tells everyone, white and black, guilty 
and innocent . . . that your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the 
violation of your rights. It implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but 
the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.21 
As a rhetorical strategy to persuade Americans of all racial identities that 
current Fourth Amendment doctrine is flawed, the emphasis on universal 
vulnerability to police domination makes sense.22 But I suspect (and Justice 
Sotomayor might agree) that the U.S. criminal legal system would not have 
reached its current scale if the burdens of criminal law were in fact roughly 
equally shared by all. Racial disparities in enforcement have made possible, 
if not motivated, the vast expansion of scale. The conception of carcerality 
that seems most useful is one that captures both the overall scale of criminal 
interventions and the deeply inegalitarian distribution of those 
interventions.23 
 
 19 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 20 Id. at 2069–70 (criticizing Fourth Amendment doctrine). 
 21 Id. at 2070–71 (internal citations omitted). 
 22 One could interpret Justice Sotomayor’s dissent as reflective of Derrick Bell’s interest-
convergence thesis that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only 
when it converges with the interests of whites.” Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and 
the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
 23 I have not yet mentioned Michel Foucault, the thinker most responsible for bringing the adjective 
“carceral” to legal and political discourse. Foucault did use “carceral” to refer to a type of governance, 
but he emphasized the panoptic surveillance of modern prisons and the adaptation of these surveillance 
strategies to other settings, such as schools, workplaces, and urban spaces. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 293–308 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d 
ed. 1995) (1977). Though Foucault recognized that carceral strategies are often deployed along racial 
lines, racial inequality or other forms of inequality do not appear to be intrinsic to his conception of “the 
carceral” (in contrast to, for example, his account of “biopolitics”). However, one dimension of Foucault’s 
account of “the carceral” is critical to my own account: his claim that “the most important effect of the 
 
116:203 (2021) The Second Amendment in a Carceral State 
211 
Indeed, a number of commentators have begun to use the term “carceral 
state” to draw specific attention to criminal law as a regime of racial 
inequality.24 This usage is more precise and more revealing than the use of 
the term to refer to all of criminal law, or to emphasize merely the scale of 
American criminal law. The emphasis on the unequal distribution of criminal 
interventions helps explain why many Americans are unimpressed by 
warnings of the rise of a police state, even warnings as eloquent and 
evocative as Justice Sotomayor’s Strieff dissent. Many Americans simply 
don’t believe that they will be subjected to heavy-handed policing and 
punishment—and as “law-abiding citizens,” they are probably right. 
A carceral state, as I use the term, is one that uses criminality to 
rationalize and naturalize the unequal distribution of political power and 
social goods. It “manag[es] a political community by subdividing it.”25 A 
carceral state is hardly the only form of inegalitarian state, but it offers a 
distinctive rationalization of inequality: it asserts that some individuals 
deserve reduced political power and public goods because they are 
“criminals.” It is important to notice that “criminal” becomes a noun that 
names a category of person, rather than simply an adjective that modifies a 
type of law or legal sanction. The classification of a person as a criminal is 
a crucial exercise of political power; it allows the state to deny to that person 
a vast range of goods and entitlements, nominally independent of criminal 
law.26 And the status criminal is more salient, and more devastating, precisely 
because not all citizens are criminals.27 In a carceral state, criminal law is 
used strategically to manage social divisions or political conflicts. That 
means that the content of criminal law is likely to look different in a carceral 
 
carceral system and of its extension well beyond legal imprisonment is that it succeeds in making the 
power to punish natural and legitimate, in lowering at least the threshold of tolerance to penality.” Id. at 
301. 
 24 See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 
(2019) (noting that prison abolitionists “trace the roots of today’s carceral state to the racial order 
established by slavery”); Rodríguez, supra note 14, at 1576 (describing “the carceral state” as “a statecraft 
that institutionalizes various forms of targeted human capture” and “carceral power” as “a totality of state-
sanctioned and extrastate relations of gendered racial-colonial dominance”). 
 25 Alice Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 563, 568 (2018). 
 26 Id. at 605–06 (discussing ostensibly civil collateral consequences of a felony conviction and noting 
that some of these consequences apply to nonfelony convictions as well). 
 27 This is part of what separates a carceral state from a police state and why the specific terms are 
important. Policing is typically conceived as a generalized supervision of all persons, and a police state 
is one in which all or most citizens are subject to arbitrary police intervention. Incarceration and criminal 
prosecution have been comparatively more limited practices, targeted to specific individuals while others 
remain “law-abiding” and unincarcerated. Cf. Wadie E. Said, Law Enforcement in the American Security 
State, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 819, 851–52 (discussing the intersection of “the carceral state,” defined as “the 
personnel and institutions that comprise our system of mass incarceration,” and “the police state in the 
political sense of the term, where authorities can pick up and remove opponents”). 
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state, for state actors will need ample discretion to decide who is “law-
abiding” and who is “criminal.” 
Criminal law is not the only mode of governance in a carceral state, 
since the model presumes some class of citizens deemed “law-abiding,” and 
the state needs to govern these citizens too. The carceral state, as a set of 
public institutions and practices, may exist alongside the welfare state, the 
administrative state, and so forth.28 But one distinctive feature of a carceral 
state, as a type of government, is that crime structures the state’s 
relationships even with those citizens classified as law-abiding. With law-
abiding citizens, the state uses the fear of crime as a governance strategy,29 
but it may also reassure that privileged group that it will enjoy strong 
protections from the state’s penal power, such as those found in the U.S. Bill 
of Rights. And of particular importance to this Essay, a carceral state may 
even offer law-abiding citizens the opportunity to participate in the 
subjugation of criminals. Hence Heller, as explained in more detail in the 
next Part. 
I have so far focused on the adjective carceral and said relatively little 
about what constitutes a state. On that question, it is worth noting that Max 
Weber’s famous definition of the modern state—that entity with a monopoly 
of legitimate violence over a given jurisdiction30—is sometimes thought to 
be inconsistent with the private right to bear arms under the Second 
Amendment.31 As others have ably demonstrated, the perceived conflict 
between Weber and a private right to bear arms is overstated if not imagined, 
since Weber did not claim that the state must hold a monopoly on all means 
of violence but instead a monopoly on legitimate violence.32 Moreover, 
 
 28 See, e.g., Kelly Lytle Hernández, Khalil Gibran Muhammad & Heather Ann Thompson, 
Introduction: Constructing the Carceral State, 102 J. AM. HIST. 18, 20 (2015) (discussing “the carceral 
state”); Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, Guns and Butter: The Welfare States, the Carceral State, and the 
Politics of Exclusion in the Postwar United States, 102 J. AM. HIST. 87, 88–89 (2015) (suggesting that 
“the carceral state” and “the welfare state” should be treated as “deeply integrated”). 
 29 See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 4–5 (2007) (arguing that crime is used 
strategically by political and other authority figures to legitimize actions not necessarily motivated by the 
desire to prevent crime, ultimately resulting in a form of governance that operates through fear of crime).  
 30 See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78 (H.H. 
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1948). 
 31 See, e.g., DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 5 (2003) 
(“This [Weberian] school further argues that the [Second] [A]mendment refers to a state militia, not a 
private one of the sort that has appeared on the American cultural landscape.”); Sanford Levinson, The 
Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 650 (1989) (noting the difference between the 
Weberian definition and the Second Amendment’s link to conceptions of republican political order). 
 32 See, e.g., Robert J. Spitzer, Don’t Know Much About History, Politics, or Theory: A Comment, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 724–26 (2004) (arguing that Weber’s assertion that the modern state 
monopolizes the legitimate use of force “does not mean that citizens are stripped of any recourse to 
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Weber apparently contemplated that a monopolist could subcontract some of 
the work of violence; he allowed that the state may designate as legitimate 
some uses of force by private citizens.33 In this Essay, I rely on a notion of a 
state as constituted by its authority to use violence and its authority to 
distinguish between licit and illicit violence. But I do not think that notion is 
exclusively Weberian, nor do I think it resolves questions about the scope of 
an individual right to bear arms. 
There are tensions between a carceral state, as I’ve just described one, 
and a democracy premised upon the equality of all citizens. But a naturalized 
conception of criminality helps manage these tensions. By a naturalized 
conception, I mean one in which to be “criminal” is understood as a matter 
of nature, necessity, natural law, or some combination thereof, rather than 
state prerogative. The naturalized conception of criminality denies that 
public officials choose who is a criminal; it asserts instead that public 
officials and positive law merely vindicate dictates of natural law.34 In the 
United States, this naturalized conception of criminality has long been 
racialized.35 
One more note about the concept of a carceral state. I have offered a 
general model that is clearly based upon the specific history and practices of 
the United States. It may be that no other country in the world fits this model. 
That does not diminish the utility of the model. Perhaps the United States 
invented a new form of government—not just once, with the Founding, but 
also a second time, after the Civil War.36 
Though I cannot trace carcerality in American history in full detail, I 
am not sure that carcerality, as I have defined it, shaped the country from the 
Founding. In fact, although concerns about abusive penal power may not 
 
justifiable violence,” providing as an example that “a citizen acting for personal self-defense acts as an 
individual, but is nevertheless accountable to the state’s judgment under the law”). Note also that 
notwithstanding Heller’s claim that the Second Amendment codified a right of self-defense, the right to 
bear arms and the right to self-defense are easily distinguishable. Persons convicted of felonies may lose 
their right to bear arms, but no court has suggested that they are also categorically barred from a self-
defense claim if they use force (by other means) against an imminent threat. Thus, a Weberian could 
embrace a right of self-defense even should he or she choose to reject a right to bear arms. 
 33 MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 156 (Talcott Parsons ed., 
A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947). 
 34 See Ristroph, supra note 25, at 566–67, 617. 
 35 See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS 1–8 (2010); Jonathan 
Simon, Racing Abnormality, Normalizing Race: The Origins of America’s Peculiar Carceral State and 
Its Prospects for Democratic Transformation Today, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1625, 1626 (2017) (addressing 
“the racial underpinnings of the carceral state”). 
 36 As David Garland notes, “[S]ocieties that have imposed punishment on a massive scale have 
generally been illiberal, undemocratic societies governed by absolutist or authoritarian states. . . . 
America’s distinctive combination of liberal democracy and penal intensity seems anomalous and poses 
an explanatory problem of some importance.” Garland, supra note 18, at 479. 
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have been central to the drafters of the original Constitution (the Articles), 
such concerns were paramount among many Antifederalists and other 
influential critics whose skepticism helped produce the first set of 
Amendments.37 The Bill of Rights reflects acute concern with the 
government’s power to turn persons into criminals.38 
To be sure, the United States was founded as a racially inegalitarian 
state, one that embraced and protected race-based chattel slavery. And 
slavery was sometimes rationalized on the grounds that enslaved persons 
constituted a class of inherently dangerous people with criminal tendencies. 
Still, it was slavery rather than criminal law that first served as the organizing 
institution for racial inequality. Only once slavery, or at least its official 
constitutional endorsement, ended did the country begin to reconstitute itself 
as a carceral state. Some of this work was done in the Reconstruction 
Amendments, which ended slavery and promised equality but with an 
asterisk: slavery was abolished “except as a punishment for crime,” and 
states would be penalized for abridging the right to vote “except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime.”39 These criminality carve-outs to 
the new guarantees of equality would soon prove useful to help constitute a 
carceral state.40 
It did not take long for Southern states to take the next steps by 
designating as “criminal” those persons formerly classified as slaves. After 
the Civil War, Southern states quickly replaced the lost labor of enslaved 
persons with a system of convict leasing, in which persons convicted of 
crimes could be leased to private businesses and forced to work.41 To ensure 
a sufficient supply of workers and to preserve antebellum racial hierarchies, 
Southern states first used Black Codes, and then vaguely defined offenses 
such as vagrancy, to select thousands of formerly enslaved persons for 
conviction and forced labor.42 Convict leasing was a distinctively Southern 
 
 37 The Antifederalists were themselves a diverse group, and the Amendments ultimately ratified 
reflected shared concerns of moderate Antifederalists and some Federalists. See Paul Finkelman, “A Well 
Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 214–
18 (2000). 
 38 See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 39 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; id. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 40 But see Hernandez et al., supra note 28, at 21 (arguing that “the carceral state . . . was first 
consolidated during the early nineteenth century”). 
 41 See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT 
OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 7–8 (2008) (discussing the correlation 
between labor demands and arrest rates of Black people for inconsequential charges as well as the 
crossover between slave-leasing practices and convict-leasing practices). 
 42 See id. at 53. Black Codes were laws enacted after the Civil War directed at Black Americans and 
intended to restrict their freedom and preserve a system of forced labor. See Michele Goodwin, The 
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practice, but a broader campaign to link all Black Americans to criminality 
was a nationwide effort, one that helped Northern states and the federal 
government tolerate the Southern practice.43 By the time the federal 
government finally forced the end of convict leasing in the 1940s and 1950s, 
the racialized conception of “the criminal” was sufficiently entrenched to 
survive on its own.44 
There still remained the problem of the federal Constitution, with a Bill 
of Rights that seemed to include constraints that would make a carceral state 
difficult if not impossible. But as the federal government insisted Southern 
states end their most transparently racialized uses of criminal law, the 
Supreme Court was in the early years of its efforts to determine the scope of 
constitutional protections for criminal defendants. As discussed in the next 
Part, interpretations of those rights have increasingly adopted a carceral 
presumption of naturalized criminality, so that the Bill of Rights can provide 
some protections for “law-abiding citizens” without getting in the way of 
prosecution of “criminals.” 
II. CARCERAL PRINCIPLES IN CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
The Bill of Rights, the textual evidence of the country’s commitment to 
individual liberty, is the pride of many Americans. Among the varied 
protections in the first ten Amendments, protections for criminal defendants 
take prominence—so much so that a new law student once asked me in 
bewildered consternation, “Why did our Founders care so much about 
criminals?” That is a very twenty-first-century question, a manifestation of 
contemporary obliviousness to the fact that, under the positive law of British 
authorities, the Founders were themselves “criminals.”45 The Founders knew 
that criminal law was a standard tool of tyrants, but the Founders’ deep 
suspicion of penal power did not survive many generations. The text of the 
Bill of Rights did survive, however, and so the Supreme Court has faced the 
 
Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and Mass Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 
899, 935–941 (2019). Evoking the prior practice of slave patrols and foreshadowing the later theory of 
the Second Amendment as a means for the law-abiding to combat criminals, white persons as private 
citizens were invited and expected to assist with vagrancy enforcement against Black persons. See Darrell 
A.H. Miller, Racial Cartels and the Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power, 100 KY. L.J. 23, 34 
(2011). 
 43 See MUHAMMAD, supra note 35, at 74–75.  
 44 See BLACKMON, supra note 41, at 377–82; MUHAMMAD, supra note 35, at 50–55 (describing 
manipulation of crime data by white authors to cultivate a nationwide perception of Black people as 
criminals). 
 45 Cf. John D. Bessler, The Death Penalty in Decline: From Colonial America to the Present, 
50 CRIM. L. BULL. 245, 250 (2014) (discussing interest in restrictions on penal power among American 
Founders and noting that the act of signing the Declaration of Independence put each signer “at risk of 
execution for treason”). 
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challenge of making the Bill of Rights safe for a carceral state.46 This Part 
explains how the Court has met the challenge, looking first at constitutional 
criminal procedure and then at Second Amendment doctrine. 
A. Rights for the Innocent, but Not for “Criminals” 
For just over a century after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, its 
provisions relating to criminal prosecutions were rarely invoked or 
adjudicated.47 The Bill of Rights was initially understood to apply only to the 
federal government, and most prosecutions occurred in state courts.48 But 
early in the twentieth century, Prohibition prompted unprecedented levels of 
federal criminal enforcement, and soon after, the Supreme Court began to 
develop the doctrines of “incorporation” that would apply the Bill of Rights 
to state governments.49 Thus, over the past century, the Court has issued 
hundreds of opinions that interpret and apply the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments. Given space constraints, I will not attempt to wade into the 
sprawling case law in great detail. Rather, I want to highlight three related 
features of these doctrines that have been documented elsewhere (including 
in my own work) but which may take on new salience as we try to 
comprehend the concept of a carceral state. Specifically, consider the Court’s 
protection of enforcement discretion, the circumstances that make discretion 
necessary, and the underlying assumption of a pre-procedural line between 
the “guilty” and the “innocent.” 
I will begin with discretion. As many commentators have noted, the 
granting and protection of police and prosecutorial discretion has been a 
major theme of constitutional criminal procedure.50 Of course, the Fourth and 
 
 46 Cf. Sara Mayeux, Youth and Punishment at the Roberts Court, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 543, 551 
(2018) (“[E]ach of the successive state-building projects of modern United States history—the 
administrative and regulatory state, the welfare state, and the surveillance state—initially posed 
challenges to constitutional culture and the rule of law, though (for better or worse) the ‘Constitution-in-
practice’ ultimately found ways to accommodate each of them.”). 
 47 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 290–91 (1998). 
 48 See id. at 291. But see Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (1996) (noting that the Bill of Rights initially applied only to the federal 
government but also tracing the Supreme Court’s initial neglect of criminal procedure rights to its lack of 
appellate jurisdiction in federal criminal cases). 
 49 Cf. Francis A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal Sanctions, 42 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 737, 748 (1981) (“[F]or practical purposes the law of the fourth amendment begins not in 1791 . . . 
but rather with the Prohibition Experiment in the 20th century.”). 
 50 See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal 
Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1425–26 (2016) (noting that some violent and abusive police conduct 
is specifically authorized by the Court); David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A 
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1070–74 (1999) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has consistently watered down constitutional restrictions on police activity . . . .”); Nirej S. Sekhon, 
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Fifth Amendments are written as constraints on state power, and the Supreme 
Court sometimes describes itself as limiting enforcement discretion.51 
Notwithstanding this rhetoric, the doctrinal protections of enforcement 
discretion are so many and so wide that it is reasonable to see constitutional 
criminal procedure as power-conferring law, granting police (and 
prosecutors) various legal powers rather than imposing duties or constraints 
upon them.52 Most of these powers are triggered by the officer’s or 
prosecutor’s articulation of suspicion. Once an officer has a certain degree 
of suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot,” he has the power—but not 
the duty or obligation—to detain the individual he finds suspicious.53 Once 
an officer suspects that an individual may pose a threat to the officer or 
others, the officer has the power—but not the duty or obligation—to frisk 
the individual, take any weapon, and even to use force to subdue the threat.54 
Once an officer has a slightly higher degree of suspicion (“probable cause”) 
to believe the individual has actually committed a specific crime, the officer 
has the power—but not the duty or obligation—to make an arrest and to use 
force if necessary to do so.55 And with the same degree of suspicion, a 
 
Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1171 (2012) (“[C]ourts do virtually 
nothing to constrain [police] departmental discretion.”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship 
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 49–52 (1997) (“[C]onstitutional law 
leaves intact a high level of discretion on the part of legislature, prosecutors, police officers, and defense 
attorneys.”). 
 51 See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (finding that “[i]n the context 
of border area stops, the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment demands something more 
than the broad and unlimited discretion sought by the Government”). But see id. at 886–87 (finding that 
stops near the border require only reasonable suspicion, which can be based in part on the “Mexican 
ancestry” of the person stopped). 
 52 Law often operates by imposing constraints and threatening sanctions, but as legal theorists 
emphasize, it also sometimes operates quite differently to confer powers rather than impose obligations. 
Standard examples are laws that create the powers to contract, bequeath property, or marry. See H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27–33 (2d ed. 1994). Much of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law is best 
understood as conferring powers on police, rather than imposing constraints on them. See Alice Ristroph, 
The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1191 (2017) (“[Constitutional] doctrine 
grants officers broad powers to stop or arrest, and . . . the power to stop [easily] becomes the power to 
use force, even deadly force.”); see also Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: 
The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 199–200 (1983) (discussing 
rules of criminal procedure as allocations of power). 
 53 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
 54 Id.; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“[T]he right to make an arrest or investigatory 
stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect 
it.”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (noting that police authority to frisk for weapons is 
not contingent on whether the weapon violates state law). 
 55 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to 
believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, 
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”); see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; cf. 
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prosecutor has the power—but not the duty or obligation—to bring formal 
charges and pursue conviction.56 Both reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause are, as interpreted by the Court, very low thresholds that are easy for 
enforcement officials to satisfy.57 
Next, why do police and prosecutors need so much discretion? Why 
would a conception of a “reasonable” search or seizure not include uniform 
enforcement of all criminal prohibitions, or at least some criteria beyond a 
bare assertion of suspicion?58 From their earliest years, American police 
forces have encountered law-breaking too widespread to make uniform 
enforcement practically, or politically, feasible.59 Though 
“overcriminalization” is often portrayed as a late-twentieth-century 
phenomenon, American criminal law has always prohibited much ordinary, 
commonplace conduct.60 Especially during Prohibition and the early years of 
automobility, when traffic laws were newly codified and promptly 
disobeyed, police encountered the specific problem of the purportedly “law-
abiding citizen” who nonetheless breaks a law.61 That is the second theme of 
criminal procedure of importance here, but it is not set forth in judicial 
opinions as plainly as the straightforward grants of discretion discussed 
above. However, historical studies of early and midcentury legal thought 
reveal an ongoing concern to balance two aims: empowering the police to 
investigate and apprehend “criminals,” while ensuring that police did not 
interfere too much with “respectable” or “law-abiding” citizens who, 
 
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005) (finding that a restraining order with mandatory 
enforcement language did not create a constitutionally cognizable police duty to enforce the order and 
noting that “[a] well established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently 
mandatory arrest statutes”). 
 56 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long as the prosecutor has 
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether 
or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his 
discretion.”). 
 57 See Cynthia Lee, Probable Cause with Teeth, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 277 (2020) 
(characterizing the prevailing interpretation of probable cause as “[a]n extremely low threshold”); id. at 
293 (noting that reasonable suspicion is a standard even lower than probable cause). 
 58 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810–13 (1996) (considering and rejecting an 
argument that police stops should not be considered “reasonable” unless the professed rationale for the 
stop met an objective standard of reasonableness beyond bare suspicion that an offense has been 
committed). 
 59 See Ristroph, supra note 2, at 1966–68 (noting that American police officers “have never been 
expected to detect every violation and apprehend every violator”); Alice Ristroph, What Is Remembered, 
118 MICH. L. REV. 1157, 1164–65, 1168–69 (2020) (noting that since their earliest days, American police 
have encountered lawbreakers frequently and have “always had a great deal of discretion”). 
 60 Ristroph, supra note 2, at 1965. 
 61 Id. at 1961, 1969; see also LISA MCGIRR, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF 
THE AMERICAN STATE 71, 80–81, 119 (2016); SARAH A. SEO, POLICING THE OPEN ROAD: HOW CARS 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN FREEDOM 31 (2019). 
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inconveniently, did seem to break the law rather frequently.62 Enforcement 
discretion was the solution to this problem. 
The Supreme Court may have been reluctant to grant such broad 
discretion if it lacked confidence that enforcement officials would wield that 
discretion wisely, in accordance with some principle. But the third feature of 
constitutional doctrine to emphasize here is the Court’s assumption that there 
is indeed an available principle to guide enforcement discretion: a pre-
procedural, or pre-enforcement, line between true criminals and the morally 
innocent. By pre-procedural, I mean that the Court assumes that before any 
investigative or adjudicative process begins, an individual’s status as 
“criminal” is already fixed. One stark illustration of this conception can be 
found in a favorite judicial critique of an exclusionary remedy for 
constitutional violations. If evidence seized in violation of the Constitution 
is excluded from legal proceedings, the Court worries that “[t]he criminal is 
to go free because the constable has blundered.”63 But what makes us sure 
that the person going free is indeed a “criminal”? Clearly, adjudication by an 
appropriate factfinder (who has considered lawfully obtained evidence) is 
not necessary to confirm criminality in the Court’s view. Nor is guilt or 
criminality simply the trivial or “technical” fact of statutory violation, made 
obvious by (possibly illegally seized) evidence, but instead the Court 
assumes that the persons that constables choose to target are in fact 
dangerous persons whom we should not want to set free.64 Technical 
violation of a statute can’t serve as a principle to help enforcers decide which 
persons, among the many who may have violated a statute, are appropriately 
targeted. But a deeply felt, if ill-defined and usually racialized, conception 
of the true criminal may do the work.65 
 
 62 SEO, supra note 61, at 156–200 (discussing the Supreme Court’s effort to balance the interests of 
“respectable” drivers with police authority to enforce traffic laws as well as other criminal laws).  
 63 The Supreme Court frequently quotes this line from People v. Defore. See, e.g., Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 148 (2009) (“[T]he criminal should not ‘go free because the constable has 
blundered.’” (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926))).  
 64 Josh Bowers is correct to observe that, in the context of an arrest, the Court has found “any and all 
considerations beyond technical guilt accuracy” to be “constitutionally meaningless.” Josh Bowers, 
Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 
66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 991 (2014). My suggestion is that the Court has been willing to leave arrests and 
other enforcement intrusions minimally regulated by constitutional standards because it has been 
confident that officials will be guided by extraconstitutional standards—a highly intuitive, natural law 
sense of who is really a criminal. 
 65 Empirical evidence about how officials choose to exercise their enforcement discretion supports 
the thesis that “black men are the prototypical criminals in the eyes of the law.” Butler, supra note 50, at 
1426; see id. at 1448 tbl.1 (presenting statistical evidence that Black people are disproportionately 
targeted by police for stop and frisks); see also Mark W. Bennett & Victoria C. Plaut, Looking Criminal 
and the Presumption of Dangerousness: Afrocentric Facial Features, Skin Tone, and Criminal Justice, 
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Throughout constitutional criminal procedure we find traces of a natural 
law theory of criminality. Law enforcement officials need discretion because 
the plain terms of criminal statutes cannot be trusted to sort reliably the true 
criminals from respectable, law-abiding citizens. Indeed, policing has 
increasingly been freed from the particulars of statutes, perhaps most 
significantly by Terry v. Ohio.66 Terry authorized police to make seizures on 
the basis of what’s come to be known as “reasonable suspicion,” and as 
interpreted by most courts, reasonable suspicion doesn’t require a belief that 
a particular statute has been violated.67 Terry launched a regime of “general 
criminality,” one in which investigations and interventions could begin on 
suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot” rather than a belief that some 
specified crime had been committed.68 Of course, prosecution itself still 
requires a specified offense, but Terry gave officers license to rummage on 
suspicion of undefined criminality, in the hopes of finding something that 
could be plausibly prosecuted. In Terry itself, the basis of the eventual 
prosecution was not attempted robbery or burglary, as one might have 
expected given the officer’s claim that he thought the defendant was “casing 
a job” in preparation for a “stick-up.”69 Rather, the actual charged offense 
was carrying a concealed weapon.70 And that makes Terry interesting in 
Second Amendment terms: why didn’t John Woodall Terry have a right to 
bear arms? 
In fact, the possibility of lawful gun possession did briefly worry the 
prosecutor at Mr. Terry’s pretrial hearing, but it did not trouble the trial 
judge.71 More generally, at least until 2008, the Second Amendment cast no 
 
51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 745, 748–49 (2018) (noting racial disparities in arrest and pretrial release 
decisions as well as sentencing). 
 66 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 67 See, e.g., United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 357 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[P]olice do not have to observe 
the equivalent of direct evidence of a particular specific crime . . . .”), opinion modified upon denial of 
reh’g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.); see also United States v. Mastin, No. 2:16-cr-542, 2018 WL 1005158, at 
*6–7 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 2, 2018) (declining to follow Pack but noting that many jurisdictions “have 
concluded that police need not have a particularized suspicion of any specific crime” to conduct a Terry 
stop, and citing cases); id. at *6 (noting that the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question). 
 68 See, e.g., United States v. Bonilla, 357 F. App’x 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2009) (“It is well-settled that 
reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot’ does not require suspicion of a specific crime, 
but rather criminal activity in general.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30)). 
 69 Terry, 392 U.S. at 6. 
 70 Id. at 7. 
 71 See John Q. Barrett, Appendix B: State of Ohio v. Richard D. Chilton and State of Ohio v. John 
W. Terry: The Suppression Hearing and Trial Transcripts, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1387, 1414–17 (1998). 
The prosecutor wanted to ask the police officer whether he had inquired of Terry’s employment 
circumstances at the time of arrest, noting that the Ohio statute permitted the carrying of a concealed 
weapon when engaged in a “legitimate business or occupation with large sums of money.” Id. at 1414. 
The trial judge apparently viewed this question as irrelevant. Id. at 1417. 
116:203 (2021) The Second Amendment in a Carceral State 
221 
shadow on Fourth Amendment doctrine, under which the mere suspicion that 
an individual is armed triggers expansive police powers.72 Just a few years 
after Terry, another stop-and-frisk case produced what is apparently the only 
pre-Heller opinion to contemplate the possibility that a constitutional right 
to bear arms might limit the “reasonableness” of a search or seizure. Adams 
v. Williams involved a stop based on an informant’s tip that a person in a 
nearby car was carrying a gun and narcotics.73 The officer approached Robert 
Williams and asked him to open his car door; when Williams rolled down 
the window instead, the officer reached inside and removed a gun from 
Williams’s waistband.74 The applicable state law allowed individuals to carry 
concealed weapons with the right permit, but the officer made no effort to 
find out whether Williams had a permit before placing him under arrest for 
weapons possession.75 The majority found no constitutional violation, 
characterizing the removal of the gun as a frisk that was permitted “whether 
or not carrying a concealed weapon violated any applicable state law.”76 The 
Court found the subsequent arrest to be based on adequate probable cause, 
which “does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element 
of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.”77 
For purposes of this Essay, Adams is significant for Justice William O. 
Douglas’s dissent, which noted that an individual-right conception of the 
Second Amendment—which neither Justice Douglas nor the Court had 
endorsed, but which was urged by “a powerful lobby”—would clash with 
the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.78 Justice Douglas’s 
dissent is noteworthy as an anomaly, apparently the only pre-Heller opinion 
from the high Court that contemplates a clash between the Second 
Amendment and the powers granted to police under Fourth Amendment 
doctrine. Otherwise, Fourth Amendment doctrine and constitutional criminal 
procedure more broadly have reconciled defendants’ rights with a carceral 
state, giving nominal recognition to constitutional protections but 
interpreting those protections to grant broad enforcement discretion. And 
 
 72 “[T]he underpinning of the Court’s entire Fourth Amendment jurisprudence . . . [is] that the safety 
of law enforcement officials justifies restrictions on liberty.” Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and 
the Second Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 939, 966 (2011). Fourth Amendment doctrine grants police much 
broader authority in public spaces than in private homes. If the Court decides that the Second Amendment 
protects a right to bear arms in public, much of this Fourth Amendment law will come into question. See 
infra note 81. 
 73 407 U.S. 143, 144–45 (1972). 
 74 Id. at 145. 
 75 Id. at 158–60 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 76 Id. at 146 (majority opinion). 
 77 Id. at 149. 
 78 Id. at 149–51 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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underlying the doctrine, I have argued, is a conception of naturalized 
criminality and confidence that enforcement officials will use discretion to 
target the true criminals. 
Heller did raise some doctrinal puzzles that hadn’t previously troubled 
the Court. Since 2008, numerous defendants have raised Second Amendment 
challenges to stops, frisks, and other police conduct that is doctrinally 
authorized when an officer suspects gun possession.79 There is presently a 
circuit split concerning Terry’s requirement that a frisk be based on 
reasonable suspicion that an individual is “armed and dangerous.” Is “armed 
and dangerous” one single concept, with the premise that any armed 
individual is therefore dangerous, or must the officer conducting a frisk have 
independent suspicion of dangerousness, based on something other than the 
presence of a weapon?80 The new salience of these and other doctrinal 
questions has led some commentators to suggest that Second Amendment 
law may place new constraints on the police authorities granted in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.81 
My aim here is not to look closely at the details of any potential 
doctrinal conflict nor to propose specific resolutions of them.82 Rather, I want 
to emphasize continuity, not conflict. Like constitutional criminal procedure, 
the new Second Amendment law launched by Heller is motivated by a law-
and-order vision that seeks the suppression of “criminals.” 
B. Arms for the Law-Abiding, to Be Used Against “Criminals” 
America’s turn toward a carceral state began at least by the late 
nineteenth century,83 and the principles of carceral political theory ran deep 
 
 79 See Bellin, supra note 8, at 28–29; Fields, supra note 8, at 1696–98. 
 80 Compare United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 698, 701 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding possession 
of a firearm to be itself sufficient to establish the requisite suspicion of dangerousness for a Terry frisk), 
with Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that evidence 
that a person is (legally) armed is not itself sufficient to warrant suspicion that the same person is 
dangerous). For a more comprehensive overview of the case law on this issue as of 2019, see Alexander 
Butwin, Note, “Armed and Dangerous” a Half Century Later: Today’s Gun Rights Should Impact Terry’s 
Framework, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1033, 1047–53 (2019). 
 81 E.g., Bellin, supra note 8, at 43 (“[W]e may be witnessing the beginning of the end of a form of 
proactive gun policing long viewed by city residents and their police chiefs as essential to public safety.”). 
So far, the Supreme Court has not decided whether the Second Amendment protects a right to “public 
carry,” or bearing arms in public spaces rather than private homes. But the Court has recently agreed to 
hear a case that raises this question. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (U.S. Apr.  
26, 2021), https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/20-
843.html [https://perma.cc/V2JA-ME2E]. A right to public carry could conflict with Terry doctrine, but 
the significance of any conflict depends in part on who holds the right to bear arms in public. 
 82 For proposed doctrinal adjustments related to Terry frisks, see Broughton, supra note 7, at 397–
405, and Fields, supra note 8, at 1687–94. 
 83 See BLACKMON, supra note 41, at 53. 
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in constitutional doctrine by the time the Court recognized an individual right 
to bear arms in Heller. It is not surprising that the specter of criminality 
would structure the decision, which recognizes an individual right of “law-
abiding, responsible citizens” to bear arms for self-defense.84 But it is only 
the specter of criminality: though the Heller Court mentioned “self-defense” 
at least eighty-three times, it usually did so without specifying the threat 
against whom the defender would use arms.85 Many, but not all, of the 
references to self-defense referred specifically to the home.86 One brief 
passage refers to “an attacker” and “a burglar,” and shortly thereafter there 
is a reference to “intruders.”87 Otherwise, though, self-defense is taken as 
self-explanatory, as though the threats that create the occasions for self-
defense are obvious to all. Heller was soon followed by McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, where the litigants and the Court were more direct about the threats 
that occasioned self-defense: “The Chicago petitioners and their amici . . . 
argue that the handgun ban has left them vulnerable to criminals.”88 Second 
Amendment doctrine has been launched with a carceral logic: the right to 
bear arms is not simply a right that belongs to some members of the political 
community but not others. It is a right that some individuals possess for the 
purpose of doing violence to other members of the community—those 
labeled “criminals.”89 
 
 84 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). Dick Heller, the petitioner, was a police 
officer who wished to keep a handgun at home. Id. at 575. 
 85 See Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 
63, 64 (2020) (noting that the Heller Court referenced self-defense eighty-three times); Darrell A.H. 
Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1294 
(2009) (noting that Heller protects a right of self-defense but “does not specify against whom, when, or 
where”). 
 86 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[The Second Amendment] surely elevates above all other interests 
the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”). 
 87 Id. at 629–30. 
 88 561 U.S. 742, 751 (2010). 
 89 Different rationales for a right to bear arms imagine different targets of the weapons: if individuals 
bear arms to hunt or for recreation, nonhuman animals or inanimate objects are the targets; if we bear 
arms to protect against tyranny, would-be tyrants are the targets; if we bear arms for self-defense, 
threatening “criminals” are the targets. Heller relies primarily on the last rationale, thus imagining 
violence as constitutive of a political community and assuming that some community members will be 
the legitimate targets of others. Relatedly, David Williams has noted that even “outgroup theories” of the 
Second Amendment, or vigorous calls for gun rights from historically disempowered groups, “argue that 
the Constitution itself assumes that the world will always be filled with hatred.” David C. Williams, 
Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists, Outgroups, and the Multicultural Landscape of the Second 
Amendment, 74 TUL. L. REV. 387, 392 (1999); see also Kate Masters, Fear of Other People Is Now the 
Primary Motivation for American Gun Ownership, A Landmark Survey Finds, TRACE (Sept. 19, 2016), 
https://www.thetrace.org/2016/09/harvard-gun-ownership-study-self-defense/ [https://perma.cc/Y8FY-
YHW4] (noting that gun owners increasingly cite self-defense as the reason to own firearms, whereas 
two decades ago recreation and hunting were more frequently cited reasons).  
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Born as it was in an already-carceral regime, Heller’s carceral logic has 
not drawn much commentary. In the remainder of this Essay, I note three 
blind spots in Second Amendment doctrine and commentary. First, the case 
law and commentary has given relatively little attention to criminal law and 
its doctrines of self-defense. Second, the intense debate over whether the 
right to bear arms is an individual right or collective right has eclipsed 
another dichotomy that is equally or more important: is the underlying right 
of self-defense a universal and inalienable one enjoyed by all individuals, or 
a selective (and possibly defeasible) one? Third, what would be the political 
implications of an individual right of self-defense that is equally enjoyed by 
all members of a political community? I take up the first two issues in the 
remainder of this Section and the third in Part III below. 
Though much Second Amendment commentary notes the contrast 
between “law-abiding citizens” and “criminals” (placing quotation marks 
around the terms), there have been few efforts to scrutinize the theory of 
criminality that underlies this contrast.90 Unlike felon or misdemeanant or 
arrestee or burglar, the noun “criminal,” as a category of person, has no 
precise legal meaning. Criminals could conceivably include all persons who 
have engaged in conduct that violates a criminal statute, whether they are 
ever charged or convicted. This definition likely would include most 
Americans and probably isn’t what Justice Samuel Alito had in mind in his 
McDonald majority opinion. Instead, the right to bear arms is necessary for 
encounters with sufficiently violent and dangerous persons—but use a gun 
against a threat later determined not sufficiently dangerous, and you may be 
the criminal.91 In court, self-defense claims often fail, for criminal statutes 
and judicial interpretations offer an affirmative defense only in narrow 
 
 90 Jacob Charles and Brandon Garrett note that federal gun enforcement strategies seek to protect gun 
rights for the “law-abiding” while imposing severe penalties on “thugs” and “gangsters” who possess 
guns. Jacob D. Charles & Brandon L. Garrett, The Trajectory of Federal Gun Crimes, U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 46–50), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3685910 [https://perma.cc/3AA6-
3LLG]. For a pre-Heller critique of the phrases “law-abiding citizen” and “criminal,” see Steven R. 
Morrison, Will to Power, Will to Reality, and Racial Profiling: How the White Male Dominant Power 
Structure Creates Itself as Law Abiding Citizen Through the Creation of Black as Criminal, 2 NW. J.L. 
& SOC. POL’Y 63, 80–85 (2007). 
 91 That is, many persons who display or actually fire weapons in purported self-defense then become 
criminal suspects and criminal defendants. Whether they ever become convicted persons depends on the 
legal evaluation of their self-defense claim. Cf. Joseph Blocher, Samuel W. Buell, Jacob D. Charles & 
Darrell A.H. Miller, Pointing Guns, 99 TEX. L. REV. 101, 101–03 (2020) (providing examples of criminal 
charges for brandishing or otherwise displaying weapons but noting that the law “falls woefully short of 
effectively regulating gun displays”); Ruben, supra note 85, at 82–88 (describing basic requirements of 
self-defense doctrine). 
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circumstances.92 Happily, some recent scholarship has scrutinized criminal 
doctrines of self-defense in relation to the Second Amendment.93 But more 
generally, I think much of the American populace, even or especially the 
legal profession, subscribes to a simplistic and false view of criminality (and 
the threats sufficient to license violence in self-defense) as intuitive and self-
evident.94 This is the naturalized view of criminality discussed above, and it 
helps Second Amendment doctrine conjure images of violent criminals 
without paying much heed to actual criminal doctrines or practices.95 
Second Amendment case law and commentary have given more 
attention to the question of criminality in one specific context: constitutional 
challenges to bans on weapon possession for certain classes of convicted 
persons.96 Heller specifically made room for “longstanding prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons” but did not say why felons should be 
excluded.97 (Again, for natural law theorists, the answer may seem obvious—
but for those aware of positive American law, the range of crimes classified 
as felonies and the enormous prosecutorial discretion to choose between 
felony and misdemeanor charges may suggest that the Court needs to explain 
why felons are so easily excluded from this right.)98 
 
 92 Typically, a self-defense claim requires showings of imminence, necessity, and proportionality. 
See Ruben, supra note 85, at 82–88; State v. Steinle, 2012-53, p. 7 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/3/12); 98 So. 3d 
973, 979 (upholding denial of self-defense claim on grounds that use of deadly force was 
disproportionate); People v. Lopez, 199 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1305–06 (2011) (upholding murder 
conviction after denial of self-defense claim and finding no error in jury instruction that fear of future 
harm did not satisfy imminence requirement). 
 93 See Ruben, supra note 85, at 64–68; Darrell A.H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the 
State, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 96–97 (2017). 
 94 See Alice Ristroph, The Curriculum of the Carceral State, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1631, 1689 (2020). 
 95 See supra notes 61–66 and accompanying text. 
 96 See, e.g., Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 447–48 (7th Cir. 2019) (rejecting argument that an 
individual convicted of a nonviolent felony (mail fraud) retains a Second Amendment right to bear arms). 
Voisine v. United States considered whether a state assault conviction counted as “a misdemeanor crime 
of domestic violence” for purposes of a federal weapons ban. 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2276 (2016) (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)). Though the Court approached the question as a matter of statutory interpretation 
and did not address constitutional issues, Justice Clarence Thomas raised concerns in dissent that the 
majority’s approach “relegate[ed] the Second Amendment to a second-class right.” Id. at 2292 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Friedman v. Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari)); see also Jacob D. Charles, Defeasible Second Amendment Rights: 
Conceptualizing Gun Laws that Dispossess Prohibited Persons, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 62–69 
(2020) (developing analytical framework to assess scope and defeasibility of Second Amendment rights). 
 97 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008); see also id. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“I am similarly puzzled by the majority’s list . . . that in its view would survive Second Amendment 
scrutiny,” including “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” (quoting id. at 626–27 
(majority opinion))). 
 98 See Ristroph, supra note 25, at 591–92. Before her appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice 
Amy Coney Barrett, the newest member of the Supreme Court, expressed doubt about whether all felons 
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The question of which offenses are a legitimate basis for denial of gun 
rights is part of a larger inquiry into who constitutes “the people” who enjoy 
Second Amendment rights.99 That debate preceded Heller and continues after 
it, with many commentators noting various groups that have historically been 
excluded from gun ownership and some urging a more universal application 
of Second Amendment rights, even to noncitizens.100 In these discussions of 
who enjoys the right, however, there has been insufficient attention to the 
ways that the right itself might change if it is universally rather than 
selectively held. In other words, the “right to bear arms” held by a subsection 
of a society may simply not be the same “right to bear arms” held by all 
members of society.  
To explain why, a few words about English history and English political 
theory are in order. The history is important because England never 
embraced a universal right to bear arms, and actual English practice could 
model for the Founders only a selective right. The political theory is 
important because one English thinker—Thomas Hobbes—did take 
seriously a universal right to self-preservation, with results that were too 
radically egalitarian for his time, and so far, also for ours. 
First, the history. Academic commentary—again, both before and after 
Heller—often invokes the right to bear arms in English law as inspiration for 
the drafters of the Second Amendment.101 For purposes of this Essay, I want 
 
are excluded from Second Amendment protections. See Kanter, 919 F.3d at 464–65 (Barrett, J., 
dissenting) (“History does not support the proposition that felons lose their Second Amendment rights 
solely because of their status as felons.”). 
 99 The Second Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. II. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, the Heller majority gave the phrase “the people” in the 
Second Amendment an interpretation much narrower than the same phrase is given in First and Fourth 
Amendment doctrines. See Heller, 544 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 100 See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the 
Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2010) (arguing that “the Second Amendment’s text 
provides no basis for limiting arms bearing to citizens”); Williams, supra note 89, at 412–13 (discussing 
the claims of “outgroups” to Second Amendment rights). 
 101 See, e.g., JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT, at ix (1994) (asserting that the right to bear arms was “born in 1689” when included 
in the English Bill of Rights “and perpetuated, with modifications, in the American Bill of Rights a 
century later”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 
461, 475 (1995) (characterizing Malcolm’s work as representative of “[t]he mainstream scholarly 
interpretation” or “the Standard Model” of the Second Amendment); David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. 
Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine: Locational Limits on the Right to Bear Arms, 
13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 205, 210 (2018) (characterizing “English arms culture of the middle ages” as 
an “ancestor” of the American right to bear arms, though insisting that early Americans sought to broaden 
the right to bear arms beyond the English precedent); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Glorious Revolution to 
American Revolution: The English Origin of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
397, 400–01 (2019) (“[T]he English historical experience really does matter because the newly 
independent Americans understood their rights against the backdrop of the English legal tradition.”). 
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to avoid debates about which historical sources are most important or 
reliable. Instead, I simply accept as true the influential work of Professor 
Joyce Lee Malcolm, who is celebrated by champions of an individual right 
to bear arms as the scholar who brought historical legitimacy to that 
interpretation of the Second Amendment, and who is cited several times in 
the Heller majority opinion.102 Malcolm’s book To Keep and Bear Arms 
argues that the right to bear arms⎯“under vigorous assault in the United 
States” at the time of publication in 1994⎯was a right of individuals by the 
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England.103 “It was this heritage 
that Englishmen took with them to the American colonies and this heritage 
which Americans fought to protect in 1775.”104 
The English right began as an instrument of state violence, on 
Malcolm’s telling—though she does not use quite that language. Instead, she 
emphasizes that the right to bear arms began as a duty to bear arms: a duty 
to help the King keep the peace and subdue his enemies. In feudal England, 
it was initially “freemen [and] the richer villeins” who “were ordered to be 
armed” for service in the King’s militia, and eventually “unfree peasants 
were included as well.”105 This duty included the duty to supply one’s own 
weapons, which caused considerable resentment.106 The duty to bear arms 
extended quite broadly to “[a]ll able-bodied men between the ages of sixteen 
and sixty,” but certain groups were excluded: clergy and Catholics were 
expected to help pay for the militia but not to participate in it, and Catholics 
were not allowed to keep weapons at home.107 
Malcolm emphasizes repeatedly that before the seventeenth century, 
bearing arms was a duty and not a right. As such, the King could restrict 
weapons possession as he pleased, and he sometimes did so based on the 
type of person or the type of weapon—again, before the seventeenth century, 
Catholics were typically selected for disarmament.108 “Although the general 
public was free to have arms, because there was no right to have weapons 
the government always had the power to disarm any individual or class of 
 
 102 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592–93. For a discussion of Malcolm’s influence, see William Glaberson, 
Dueling Scholars Join Fray Over a Constitutional Challenge to Gun Control Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
21, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/21/us/dueling-scholars-join-fray-over-a-constitutional-
challenge-to-gun-control-laws.html [https://perma.cc/EQG7-HPYV]. For a summary of critiques of 
Malcolm’s work, see Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in Historiographical Crisis: Why the 
Supreme Court Must Reevaluate the Embarrassing “Standard Model” Moving Forward, 39 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1727, 1795–99 (2012). 
 103 MALCOLM, supra note 101, at ix. 
 104 Id. at 134. 
 105 See id. at 3–4. 
 106 Id. at 3–5. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 9–11. 
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individuals it considered dangerous to the peace of the realm.”109 But 
selective disarmament was used to protect more than peace or religious 
hierarchy: it was a strategy to protect property and class interests as well, 
especially the interests of the aristocracy in hunting for sport and protecting 
their game from poorer persons seeking actual nourishment.110 And when 
Catholic monarchs held power in the seventeenth century, they reversed 
earlier religious exclusions and took care to disarm their Protestant 
enemies.111 
In 1688, the Glorious Revolution ended the reign of the Catholic James 
II and installed William of Orange and his wife Mary (James II’s daughter, 
and a Protestant) as rulers.112 Relatively quickly, William and Mary 
summoned a “Convention” of elected representatives (because William and 
Mary were not yet King and Queen, and only a King could summon a true 
“parliament”).113 This Convention drafted and presented to William and 
Mary a Declaration of Rights identifying thirteen “true, ancient, and 
indubitable” rights of Englishmen, including a provision “[t]hat the Subjects, 
which are Protestants, may provide and keep Arms, for their common 
Defence.”114 As Malcolm puts it, “While the right of subjects to have arms 
had been singled out as one of the ‘true, ancient, and indubitable’ rights to 
be included in the Declaration of Rights, it was neither true, ancient, nor 
indubitable. The Convention members themselves were its authors.”115 After 
endorsing the Declaration of Rights and becoming King, William (and 
Parliament) began to disarm Catholics to reduce any risk of a Catholic 
counterrevolution.116 Thus, in England, the right to bear arms was clearly 
man-made, born after decades of civil war and in anticipation of potential 
further conflict. And in England, if Malcolm’s history is accurate, the right 
to bear arms was always a selective right, a right of some Englishmen to 
disarm and dominate others. 
The drafters of the Second Amendment knew the English history but 
were not bound by it. They could, in theory, have established a new and 
distinctively American right to bear arms, one designed to give all citizens 
equal protection against government tyranny rather than one designed to 
allow some citizens to dominate others. I take no position here on what the 
 
 109 Id. at 11. 
 110 See id. at 11–15. 
 111 See id. at 31–53, 103–06; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592–93 (2008) 
(citing these passages for the same proposition). 
 112 MALCOLM, supra note 101, at 111–13. 
 113 Id. at 114. 
 114 Id. at 115, 118. 
 115 Id. at 115. 
 116 Id. at 122–23. 
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actual drafters of the Second Amendment intended, though the next Part of 
this Essay explores what a universally held right to bear arms might entail. 
But whatever the Framers intended, when the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Second Amendment more than two centuries after its adoption, the Court 
ultimately followed English precedent, at least insofar as the Court declined 
to embrace a right to bear arms enjoyed equally by all. Like the English right, 
Heller’s right to bear arms would be selective, a right of some individuals to 
bear arms for the purposes of overwhelming other members of the 
community perceived to be dangerous. But unlike the English right, Heller’s 
principle of selection is not religion or class, nor indeed would modern 
constitutional doctrine allow any openly racial criteria to determine who 
would have the privilege of using force against whom.117 Instead, criminality 
(natural, intrinsic criminality) could serve as the selection principle. The 
Court explicitly endorsed the exclusion of felons and implicitly endorsed the 
exclusion of any citizen not sufficiently “responsible” or “law-abiding.”118 
Thus, the Second Amendment arrived in a carceral state and immediately 
accommodated itself. 
I have been speaking of the right to bear arms, for that is what the text 
of the Second Amendment and the Court’s recent decisions most explicitly 
protect. But Heller and many commentators view the right to bear arms as a 
necessary implication of a different, broader right: a right to self-defense or 
self-preservation.119 Perhaps Heller’s embrace of a selective right to bear 
 
 117 The limitation of the English right to bear arms to Protestants is mentioned in Heller but is not 
treated as consequential; the Court found Malcolm’s emphasis on the individual character of the right 
more notable than the religious restriction. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593 (2008) 
(“To be sure, it was an individual right not available to the whole population, given that it was restricted 
to Protestants . . . . But it was secured to them as individuals . . . .”). 
 118 See id. at 626 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons . . . .”); id. at 635 (“[W]hatever else [the Second 
Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”). 
 119 See, e.g., id. at 635 (holding that the District of Columbia’s ban on the possession of handguns in 
the home for purposes of self-defense violates the Second Amendment); David B. Kopel, The Natural 
Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for the World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 237 (2008) (arguing 
that Heller vindicates a preexisting natural right to self-preservation or self-defense). Though Second 
Amendment doctrine and discourse treat self-defense and self-preservation as interchangeable, the two 
concepts are distinguishable from one another, and both are distinct from a right to bear arms. Self-
defense is usually understood as actions against a specific threat, while self-preservation may entail 
preemptive protective actions even before a threat is manifest, or the infliction of harm on someone who 
does not pose a threat. If three sailors adrift on a lifeboat kill and eat an ailing and immobilized 
companion, the act is plausibly one of self-preservation but not one of self-defense. See Kimberly Kessler 
Ferzan, Defending Imminence, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 247–48 (2004) (distinguishing self-preservation 
from self-defense using the infamous facts of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens). Bearing arms can be a 
particular method of self-defense or self-preservation, but it does not precisely overlap with either 
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arms rests upon an underlying theory in which some persons, but not all, 
have a right of self-defense. My final Part explores two theories of self-
defense—one universal, one selective—from English philosophers who 
lived and wrote in the decades when Englishmen transformed the bearing of 
arms from a duty into a right. 
III. WHICH LIVES MATTER? TWO THEORIES OF SELF-DEFENSE 
Between Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Locke (1632–1704), 
there’s little question who wears the laurels as the philosopher behind 
American constitutionalism. Among modern commentators, including 
Supreme Court Justices, Locke is seen as a champion of individual rights and 
limited government and, as such, is celebrated and cited frequently.120 
Hobbes is occasionally grudgingly acknowledged as the thinker who 
pioneered the idea that government legitimacy depends on the consent of the 
governed, but he is typically viewed as having betrayed any individualist or 
liberal principles by ultimately advocating a Leviathan—an undivided and 
seemingly absolute sovereign.121 A few scholars have argued that Hobbes 
influenced the Founders much more than usually acknowledged, but I will 
 
concept: there are ways of defending oneself without weapons, and there are ways of using weapons that 
are not defensive. 
 120 Locke is invoked often both by those who endorse a strong individual right to bear arms and those 
who would restrict gun ownership. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 892 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Locke for the proposition that individuals in society must give up many 
rights that they may have held in the state of nature); Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: 
An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 15–16 (1992) 
(noting influence of Locke on both Second and Ninth Amendment scholarship); see also Michael Steven 
Green, Why Protect Private Arms Possession? Nine Theories of the Second Amendment, 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 131, 154–58 (2008) (outlining an argument for an individual right to bear arms based on 
principles of “Lockean . . . autonomy”). 
 121 Hobbes was an advisor to Charles II and an apparent enthusiast about the English monarchy. 
Perhaps for that reason, many contemporary commentators assume that Hobbes’s sovereign is to be an 
absolute monarch, though in fact Hobbes contemplated that sovereignty could reside in many different 
sorts of institutions, including an elected assembly. See Richard Tuck, Introduction to THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN, at ix–x, xxxvii (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651). Hobbes specialists note frequently the 
difference between Hobbes’s actual arguments and “Hobbism,” or the caricature of his work that pervades 
popular understandings. See Sterling P. Lamprecht, Hobbes and Hobbism, 34 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 31, 34–
37 (1940). In numerous works, I have tried—without apparent success—to draw American legal scholars’ 
attention to the radical egalitarianism in Hobbes’s vision of individual rights. See generally Alice 
Ristroph, Sovereignty and Subversion, 101 VA. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2015) (arguing that Hobbes is often 
mischaracterized or misread); Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. 
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not try to resolve that question here.122 My focus in this Essay is the Second 
Amendment as understood by the Supreme Court today, and my inquiry in 
this Part is into conceptions of self-defense that could conceivably have 
informed Heller’s right to bear arms. I will suggest that it is no surprise that 
Locke’s theories have been more influential, but we have not yet appreciated 
why Locke rather than Hobbes would be so attractive to the Founders as 
architects of an inegalitarian state, or a carceral one. Hobbes, the supposed 
absolutist, actually envisioned a universal right of self-preservation and a 
right to resist punishment; Locke, the supposed liberal egalitarian, articulated 
a selective right to self-defense and a natural right to punish. 
Hobbes began his political theory by imagining humans without a 
polity—humans in a state of nature without an established political 
authority.123 In such a condition, two features of human existence are of great 
significance: humans’ equal physical vulnerability and the universal desire 
for self-preservation.124 Hobbes emphasized that, though humans vary in 
intelligence and strength, no one is so smart or so strong that he can repel 
every assault or avoid eventual death. Each person, aware of his own 
vulnerability, will seek self-preservation: he will act to secure himself 
against danger as best he can. Notably, Hobbes’s account of the state of 
nature is not simply a set of empirical claims but a normative argument: 
Hobbes claimed that each individual has not simply the desire but a natural 
right to self-preservation.125 From this account, Hobbes derived two 
principles so radical for his era that he had to flee England for a time and yet 
so influential that today’s liberals take them for granted. Hobbes argued that 
given humans’ equal vulnerability and equal right to self-preservation, no 
one has a natural right to rule over others, and any legitimate government 
must be based on the consent of the governed.126 
But Hobbes then went on to imagine the particular structure of 
government to which individuals should (and would, he claimed) give their 
consent. He argued that divided governments with meaningful limits on 
sovereign power would be unstable and that humans entering a social 
contract should establish a sovereign with absolute power.127 Or more 
precisely, almost absolute power. The natural right of self-preservation was 
 
 122 See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 71–72 (1992); Gary L. McDowell, Private Conscience & 
Public Order: Hobbes & The Federalist, 25 POLITY 421, 423 (1993). 
 123 HOBBES, supra note 121, at 86–90. 
 124 Id. at 87–89. 
 125 Id. at 91. 
 126 See id. at 117–19. 
 127 See id. at 120. 
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inalienable on Hobbes’s account.128 It was not incompatible with political 
authority, even in the form of a very powerful sovereign; in most instances, 
submitting to authority was the best means of self-preservation. But in the 
event that a sovereign sought to destroy a subject rather than preserve him, 
Hobbes made clear that the subject’s natural right to self-preservation gave 
him a right to resist the sovereign. This right to resist extended to all cases 
of punishment, including “Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment,” not 
simply capital punishment.129 Hobbes reasoned that one who allowed himself 
to be physically restrained would put himself at the mercy of his captor, 
which was inconsistent with the natural right of self-preservation.130 To be 
clear, Hobbes also recognized that sovereignty included a right to impose 
punishment, but subjects bore no duty to submit even to rightful 
punishment.131 For Hobbes’s contemporaries, these ideas were strange and 
radical. Leviathan was denounced as a “Rebells catechism,” and Hobbes 
himself as “the Monster of Malmesbury.”132 
Contrast this account of self-preservation with the account from John 
Locke, who “discreetly [wove] strands of [Hobbes’s] philosophy into . . . 
less noxious fabrics of thought.”133 How did Locke tame Hobbes for polite 
company? Today’s commentators rarely understand that it was Hobbes’s 
egalitarianism (and likely atheism) that made him the Monster of 
Malmesbury, not Leviathan’s then-unremarkable endorsement of an 
absolute sovereign.134 Consequently, they tend to see the difference between 
Hobbes and Locke as lying in Locke’s supposedly more genteel state of 
nature and his endorsement of limited rather than absolute government.135 A 
better explanation of Locke’s amendments to Hobbesian theory takes notice 
of the fact that seventeenth-century Englishmen, and eighteenth-century 
 
 128 Id. at 93. 
 129 Id. at 93. 
 130 See id. at 93–94. 
 131 Thus, for Hobbes, rights do not imply correlative duties. For more on Hobbes’s right to resist 
punishment, including a discussion of Hobbes’s conception of rights, see Ristroph, Respect and 
Resistance, supra note 121, at 615–18. 
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(London 1680) (“But his Leviathan, and other Books of his are so full of Madness and Folly, that ’tis 
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 133 McDowell, supra note 122, at 424. 
 134 See COWLEY, supra note 132. 
 135 Ryan Patrick Alford, Is an Inviolable Constitution a Suicide Pact? Historical Perspective on 
Executive Power to Protect the Salus Populi, 58 ST. LOUIS L.J. 355, 363–64 (2014) (characterizing 
Hobbes as a theorist of “undivided and unlimited sovereignty” and contrasting his work to the 
“constitutionalist” theories of Locke and others). 
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American colonists, were in no way ready to embrace a comprehensive 
vision of natural human equality. These men were writing a Declaration of 
Rights with explicit religious preferences or writing a Constitution to 
accommodate slavery.136 For themselves, they may have liked the idea of a 
social contract and government by consent, but they were not prepared to 
recognize in every human equal political standing. 
Locke tamed Hobbes by embracing the language of equality even as he 
naturalized inequality. He characterized the state of nature as a “state of 
perfect equality,”137 but it is worth looking closely at the basis for equality in 
Locke’s state of nature. “Creatures of the same species and rank . . . 
should . . . be equal,”138 but are all humans in that category? It rapidly 
becomes clear that in Locke’s state of nature, there are “offenders” who need 
to be punished, and natural equality becomes, in fact, a right to punish 
enjoyed equally among “the innocent” to be exercised against “offenders.”139 
Who are the offenders? Locke contemplated a law of nature (“no one ought 
to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions”) and assumed that 
transgressions of this law would be self-evident—or at any rate, evident to 
“the innocent” who would impose punishment.140 Strikingly, Locke’s chapter 
on the state of nature is primarily about punishment and inequality, an effort 
to explain why “in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over 
another.”141 
It bears emphasis that to naturalize a right to punish is to make 
inequality, not equality, the natural condition of humankind. There can be no 
 
 136 See supra Section II.B (discussing religious preferences in the English Declaration of Rights); 
Paul Finkelman, How the Proslavery Constitution Led to the Civil War, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 405, 407 (2013) 
(discussing some of the protections the Constitution of 1787 gave to chattel slavery). Notably, many state 
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Locke’s involvement in the Carolina constitution, his attitudes toward slavery, and the “mutually 
constitutive relationship between liberalism and colonialism,” see David Armitage, John Locke, 
Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government, 32 POL. THEORY 602, 602 (2004). 
 137 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 272 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1988) (1689) (different typeface and capitalization than original). 
 138 Id. at 269. 
 139 See id. at 271–72. 
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acknowledging that he placed a right to punish in the state of nature because he saw no other way to 
rationalize a sovereign’s power to punish foreign nationals. See id. at 272–73. In addition to classifying 
violations of the law of nature as a “crime” in need of punishment, Locke argued that the individual 
injured by these violations could seek “reparation” from the offender. Id. at 273. It is only in the context 
of that right of reparation that Locke even mentions self-preservation as a natural right in this chapter. 
See id. 
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right to punish in Hobbes’s state of nature, for who would hold that right if 
not everyone equally? Good guys and bad guys are not natural, self-evident 
categories for Hobbes; rather, disagreement about what is good, lawful, or 
desirable is a fundamental problem faced by mankind. In Hobbes’s state of 
nature, without a shared authority to resolve these disagreements, each 
person has an equally valid claim to act in reasonable pursuit of his own self-
preservation. In Locke’s state of nature, in contrast, there are good guys and 
bad guys, “the innocent” but also “criminals” and “offenders.”142 The good 
guys (presumably) have the right to preserve themselves against the 
“criminals,” but Locke doesn’t even address self-defense until later; instead, 
Locke first grants the good guys the right to punish offenders. By contrast, 
Hobbes insists that crime is a category that existed only after the 
establishment of a sovereign. Thus, both thinkers contemplate violent 
conflict in the state of nature, but only Locke picks sides, granting moral 
authority to “punish” to a select set of persons and labeling the rest 
“criminals.” 
Locke does not mention a right of self-defense until he describes the 
state of war, which arises when one man has declared “by word or action, 
not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate setled design, upon another mans 
life.”143 In such circumstances, “the safety of the innocent is to be preferred,” 
and he has the right to destroy any attacker “as beasts of prey.”144 Locke’s 
theory of self-defense allows the “innocent” man a right to kill even “a thief, 
who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any 
farther then, by the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away 
his money.”145 In a distorted echo of Hobbes’s right to resist even noncapital 
punishment, Locke argues that “I have no reason to suppose, that he, who 
would take away my liberty, would not when he had me in his power, take 
away every thing else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him, as one 
who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can . . . .”146 
Locke does not contemplate how the thief might respond, but he clearly does 
not view the thief as having an equal right to use force in response. 
Thus, for Locke, the pre-political world is one in which some, but not 
all, individuals have a right to do violence to others. Writing not long after 
Hobbes and having studied his work,147 Locke had surely encountered 
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Hobbes’s claim that good faith disagreements about what is reasonable—
what property is rightfully mine, what threats are sufficiently dangerous that 
I may reasonably respond, what degree of force is reasonable—are 
unavoidable problems faced by humans in the absence of political authority. 
But Locke seemed to dismiss this claim, assuming that reason would make 
itself known and the difference between the innocent and the aggressor 
would simply be self-evident. From this assumption arises the premise of 
natural inequality that shapes Locke’s account—rights of violence that 
belong to some but not to others. In discussing self-defense, Locke writes 
that “force, or a declared design of force upon the person of another, where 
there is no common superior on Earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of 
war: and ’tis the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even 
against an aggressor, though he be in society and a fellow subject.”148 But 
what is punishment, endorsed by Locke with enthusiasm, but “force, or a 
declared design of force upon the person of another”?149 Why would the 
target of punishment, whether in the state of nature or in civil society, not 
have equal claim to kill the “innocent” punisher? 
It is not difficult to see whose theory better fits a Second Amendment 
for a carceral state: not Hobbes, the atheist, egalitarian Monster of 
Malmesbury, but Locke, that pious carceralist. For Hobbes, all lives matter 
equally; for Locke, the lives of the “innocent” are to be preferred, while the 
lives of “criminals” are as easily ended as those of “beasts of prey.” For 
Hobbes, it is important to recognize that all government is artificial, all 
sovereignty the product of human agreement, and thus all classifications of 
conduct as criminal are the decisions of a recognized political authority. 
Hobbes insists that without a sovereign, the category “criminal” does not 
exist. Locke, in contrast, uses the language of criminality to sanctify a 
selective right to use violence, an inegalitarian world where, by nature, some 
individuals have power over others. And it is Locke’s tradition that Heller 
endorses. 
CONCLUSION 
Dick Heller was a policeman, and it would have been strange indeed if 
his efforts to secure his own right to bear arms had produced new constraints 
on police authority.150 But Heller arrived in an already-carceral state, and it 
was decided by the same Court that has helped enable the development of 
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that state.151 This Essay argues that Heller reaffirmed carceral principles 
rather than undermined them. Doctrinal tensions between an individual right 
to bear arms and broad police authority to disarm may occupy courts for 
some time, but courts are likely to resolve these tensions by reaffirming or 
even expanding a criminality exception to the Second Amendment. And the 
concept of criminality that informs this exception is likely to be as 
discretionary, naturalized, and racialized in this context as it is elsewhere in 
American law. 
More interesting than doctrinal puzzles, in my view, is a cultural 
embrace of the contrast between “law-abiding citizen” and “criminal,” a 
contrast that is increasingly visible outside the courts. In a number of widely 
reported incidents, self-appointed private guardsmen have identified 
unarmed men as purported criminals and shot and killed them, later raising 
claims of self-defense.152 The racial dimensions are impossible to ignore, 
with the shooter usually white and the victim usually Black. But I think we 
need to give still more attention to the carceral logic of these encounters: the 
men who bear arms (and use them) in these situations communicate a view 
of society divided into law-abiding citizens and criminals. Not merely (or 
even) a regrettable inconvenience, the presence of criminals and the need to 
subdue them is constitutive of a carceral society. To bear arms and to use 
them is what it means to be American on this view. Actual positive laws are 
secondary to this logic, as evidenced on January 6, 2021, when protesters—
mostly white, many armed—broke various criminal statutes and forced their 
way inside the U.S. Capitol.153 President Donald Trump was initially 
reluctant to condemn this group154: “My people aren’t thugs,” he supposedly 
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said.155 The participants identified themselves as “law-abiding” citizens, and 
one explained afterward that though he took an envelope from Speaker of 
the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s office, he left a quarter 
behind as payment, proclaiming, “I’m not a thief.”156 
In the ongoing prosecutions of those who participated in the January 6 
raid on the Capitol, we see an effort to reclaim the authority of positive law 
over these naturalistic ideas. But real progress toward racial equality will 
likely require a much broader and deeper effort to expose and then reject the 
naturalized conception of criminality that underpins so much of American 
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